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MUDDYING THE CHEVRON WATERS: THE D.C. 
CIRCUIT LACKS DOCTRINAL CLARITY IN 
WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE v. EPA 
Abstract: Chevron deference is one of the most contentious and misunderstood 
doctrines in administrative law. Justice John Paul Stevens’ opinion in the water-
shed 1984 case Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
established a two-step framework for courts to use in evaluating agency rule-
making authority. That clear two-step process has undergone rewording and re-
vision over the years that has resulted in a lack of doctrinal clarity. On April 11, 
2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit decided Waterkeeper Alli-
ance v. EPA, a challenge brought by environmentalists to an EPA rule that ex-
empted farmers from reporting certain types of pollution. Purporting to apply 
Chevron, the D.C. Circuit determined that the EPA did not possess the authority 
to pass the exemption. This Comment argues that although the D.C. Circuit ar-
rived at the correct result, it did so in a doctrinally confusing manner by not 
clearly delineating the Chevron two-step test, thereby potentially complicating 
future Chevron analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal agencies have considerable influence over the laws and regula-
tions that govern nearly all aspects of American life—from how we com-
municate and the prices businesses are allowed to charge us, to what we eat 
and drink and how we protect our environment.1 Since 1984, actions taken by 
federal agencies have been analyzed under a doctrine called Chevron defer-
ence, which instructs courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a law 
administered by that agency when that law is ambiguous.2 
At the broadest level, Chevron establishes a hierarchy for interpretative 
authority for statutes.3 At the top is Congress, whose will is expressed 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (discussing the IRS’s final rule 
regarding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (reviewing the FCC’s declaratory ruling regarding 
cable companies providing internet access), Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines Inc., 501 U.S. 680 (1991) 
(reviewing the Department of Labor’s regulation concerning the Black Lung Benefits Act); INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (concerning the language of the Immigration and National-
ity Act); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 842 (1984) (concerning 
the EPA’s interpretation of an ambiguity in the Clean Air Act). 
 2 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 3 See id. at 842–43 (establishing a procedure for judicial review of agency action that looks 
first to congressionally-written statutory text, then to the reasonableness of agency interpretation 
of that text). 
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through the text of the statute itself.4 Next is the agency responsible for im-
plementing that statute, which has the authority to act when Congress’s will is 
not clear.5 Last are the courts, which under Chevron, are to defer to agency 
interpretation, and are not to substitute their own “preferred” interpretation.6 
This Comment focuses on one instance of judicial review under the 
Chevron deference standard before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit in the case of Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA.7 Part I of this Comment 
discusses the current state of Chevron deference and introduces the facts of 
Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA.8 Part II analyzes the reasoning of the two opin-
ions of the D.C. Circuit in Waterkeeper Alliance.9 Finally, Part III argues that 
although the D.C. Circuit reached the correct decision in Waterkeeper Alli-
ance, it did so in a manner that only further confuses Chevron analysis and 
represents a dangerous trend of the judiciary over-deferring to agencies.10 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND 
WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE V. EPA 
Since 1984 the standard of review for courts reviewing federal agency 
decision-making has been that laid out in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.11 What became known after the case as 
Chevron deference requires judicial deference to agency interpretations of 
federal statutes, provided that those statutes are ambiguous and the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable.12 If both conditions are met, the court must defer 
to the agency’s interpretation of the statute, regardless of whether the court 
agrees with the agency’s interpretation or believes that the interpretation is the 
best one possible.13 Part A of this section briefly outlines the meaning of 
Chevron deference and the current debate over what the test entails.14 Part B 
 4 Id. at 842–43 (stating that courts “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress”). 
5 Id. at 843–44. This occurs when the statute is ambiguous. Id. 
6 Id. at 865. 
7 Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2017). This is not to be confused 
with a Second Circuit decision involving the same parties. See generally Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 
399 F.3d 486 (2nd Cir. 2005) (evaluating similar agency permitting authority under the Clean 
Water Act). 
8 See infra notes 11–60 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 61–93 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 94–106 and accompanying text. 
11 467 U.S. 842, 842–43 (1984); see also Jonathan Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 
MO. L. REV. 983, 985 (2016) (describing Chevron as a “fixture” in administrative law and noting 
that it is cited by federal appellate courts in over 200 cases each year). 
12 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
13 Id. at 843. 
14 See infra notes 16–47 and accompanying text. 
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of this section discusses the facts and procedural posture of Waterkeeper Alli-
ance v. EPA.15 
A. The Meaning of Chevron’s Two Steps 
In Chevron, Justice John Paul Stevens established a two-question pro-
cess for reviewing a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute.16 The first 
question analyzes the text of the statute in question, seeking to determine 
whether it unambiguously expresses the intent of Congress.17 If the court 
finds no ambiguity in the text, then the Chevron inquiry is over, and Con-
gress’s interpretation stands.18 If, however, the court does find ambiguity, 
then the agency’s interpretation will survive, as long as it is a reasonable in-
terpretation of that ambiguity.19 The consensus is that the step-two reasona-
bleness inquiry is equivalent to arbitrary and capricious review.20 
These two questions are the two “steps” of Chevron: the statute is inter-
preted, de novo, by the reviewing court to determine if there is any ambiguity, 
and if there is, then the agency’s proffered interpretation controls as long as 
that interpretation is reasonable.21 Justice Stevens’s opinion makes it clear 
that the steps are intended to be sequential, because if the court determines 
that the statute is unambiguous, then “that is the end of the matter.”22 If there 
is no ambiguity to be found in the statute, then there is no room for the agen-
cy to exercise its interpretive authority.23 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See infra notes 48–60 and accompanying text. 
 16 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 17 Id. (“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”) 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question 
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute.”) 
 20 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 359 (7th ed. 2011) (stating that the “weight of scholarly opinion” 
equates step two of Chevron with arbitrary and capricious review); JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1009 
(7th ed. 2014) (noting that arbitrary and capricious review is the standard called for by the Admin-
istrative Procedures Act). The Supreme Court has explained that a court can set aside an agency 
action as arbitrary and capricious if the agency completely lacks a rational explanation for its 
decision; for example, if the agency “offer[ed] an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before [it]” or is “so implausible” that it cannot be explained by a “difference in 
view.” Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 21 Chevron, 853 F.3d at 842–43. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See id. (“[T]he court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously ex-
pressed intent of Congress.”) 
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In the years since Chevron was decided, however, this clear two-step 
process has been muddied to the point that some scholars claim that courts 
now engage in only a single step review for reasonableness, removing the 
first step from the analysis.24 The Supreme Court contributed to the confusion 
in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., in which Justice Antonin Scalia, writing 
for the majority, admitted to skipping step one of Chevron, arguing that step 
one was not needed because the second-step reasonableness inquiry neces-
sarily covered whether Congress had spoken directly on the issue.25 In INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, the Court invoked Chevron for the proposition that agency 
interpretations are invalid if they contradict clear congressional intent, but did 
so without delineating the two-step process.26 The majority admitted that the 
statute included ambiguity, the resolution of which would warrant deference, 
but that the agency’s interpretation was incorrect nonetheless.27 Justice Scalia 
wrote a concurring opinion criticizing the majority for its misunderstanding 
of the role of the courts in statutory interpretation and the meaning of Chev-
ron.28 
Supporters of the argument that the two steps are redundant claim that 
step one is merely a species of step two: if Congress has spoken directly on 
the issue, then any agency interpretation that contradicts Congress’s purpose 
is necessarily unreasonable.29 At times, the courts are rather clear that they are 
only engaging in a single-step inquiry.30 This is not always the case, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 24 Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 
597, 598 (2009). 
 25 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4. What is surprising about Justice Scalia’s position here is that it con-
tradicts the reasoning laid out in his widely cited defense of Chevron, which was that any potential 
for over-deference could be curbed by a strong reading of Chevron step one. See Antonin Scalia, 
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L. J. 511, 521 (arguing 
that a “strict constructionist” approach to statutory interpretation results in fewer instances of 
ambiguity for agencies to interpret). Justice Scalia states that the justification for Chevron defer-
ence comes from Congress’s intent to delegate to executive agencies the power to resolve ambigu-
ities in statutes. Id. at 516. This places step one, which determines whether any ambiguity is pre-
sent, at the forefront. Id. In the article Justice Scalia argues that if courts tend to find that the 
meaning of statutes are apparent from the text (which, as a supporter of textualism, he often 
would), then there will be fewer opportunities for Chevron deference to rear its head. Id. at 521. 
 26 See 480 U.S. 421, 447–48 (1987) (citing Chevron but failing to explicitly proceed through 
the two-step analysis). 
 27 Id. at 448. Notably, the court did not engage in a reasonableness analysis for the agency’s 
interpretation. Id. 
 28 Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority’s formulation for over-stating the 
authority of the judiciary and describing it as an “evisceration” of Chevron). 
 29 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 599. 
 30 See Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 218 (examining an agency interpretation for reasonableness 
without first determining whether the statute was ambiguous). 
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and this inconsistency has led to the murky state of the doctrine inherited by 
the D.C. Circuit in Waterkeeper.31 
The argument for a two-step test draws from the text of Chevron as writ-
ten by Justice Stevens, and emphasizes a clear sequential inquiry.32 A strict 
reading of Chevron step one places primary emphasis on statutory text, look-
ing only at the clarity of Congress’s instructions.33 Step one, as the interpreta-
tion of statutory text, answers the question of law as to Congress’s intent.34 If 
ambiguity is found, then what is left is a question of implementation, which is 
a policy area governed by the relevant agency, not congressionally-created 
law.35 
How thoroughly the court treats the step one question has significant 
implications for future agency lawmaking in the area covered by the statute in 
question.36 If the court determines that the statute means (or cannot mean) X, 
then that decision precludes later agency interpretations that contradict X.37 A 
decision that the statute may mean Y, but does not have to, however, does not 
limit future agency interpretations.38 In National Cable & Telecommunica-
tions Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, the Supreme Court ruled that an 
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute takes precedence over a 
court’s prior interpretation if the two conflict.39 Thus the courts must be clear 
                                                                                                                           
 31 See Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 534 (applying Chevron without proceeding through a 
two-step analysis); see also Freeman v. Quicken Loans, 566 U.S. 624, 631 (2012) (stating that the 
Court was not applying Chevron, despite determining that the statute unambiguously forecloses 
the agency’s interpretation). 
 32 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; see Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s 
Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 618 (2009) (arguing that courts that do not engage in explicit step 
one analysis are not clear as to what standard they are reviewing under, and thereby tend to over-
extend their role in the interpretive process). 
 33 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 34 RICHARD PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 161–62 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining that 
once a court concludes at Chevron step one that Congress did not resolve the issue in question, it 
is now an issue of policy, not law). 
 35 Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) (stating that resolution of am-
biguity is a question of policy, delegated to the agency by Congress); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864–
66; see Health Ins. Ass’n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (describing agency 
interpretation of ambiguity as a policy decision entitled to judicial deference). 
 36 Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 24, at 600 (arguing for a one-step approach and sug-
gesting that a strict independent step one inquiry can result in less room for agency interpretation, 
because it invites the judiciary to make a point determination on the statute at the outset—thereby 
fixing its interpretation, rather than simply setting the limits on a range of permissive interpreta-
tions—which limits the number of opportunities for agencies to submit their own interpretation) 
 37 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005); 
Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 32, at 616. 
 38 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983; Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 32, at 616. 
 39 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982. This power is only available to the agency at Chevron step two. 
Id. at 982–83. If the prior court interpretation ruled that the statute was unambiguous (a step one 
determination), then there is no room for the agency to exercise any authority. Id. 
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about what test they are purporting to use in order to be clear about what the 
impact of their decision will be.40 
The debate over Chevron, in addition to its practical significance within 
administrative law, also implicates the fundamental nature of separation of 
powers in the federal system of government.41 The power to make substantive 
law in the federal sphere rests, originally, entirely with Congress.42 Agency 
power derives from grants from Congress in two ways: through explicit dele-
gation in the text of statutes, and implied delegation via the agencies’ power 
to resolve statutory ambiguities when implementing them.43 Chevron serves 
to maintain the proper role of agency power, as directed by Congress—to 
allow control where Congress intended to control, and delegate where it in-
tended to delegate.44 Maintaining this balance is necessary to maintain politi-
cal accountability (by vesting power in democratically-elected legislators) 
while allowing for the smooth and effective operation of the federal govern-
ment (by allowing expert administrators to fill in gaps in laws passed by 
Congress).45 Chevron seeks to properly balance the roles of the three branch-
es of government in statutory interpretation.46 This requires accommodating 
Congress’s legislative and the executive’s quasi-legislative (via rulemaking) 
powers with the role of the judiciary to “say what the law is.”47 
B. Facts and Procedural History of Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA 
Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA is a challenge brought by environmentalist 
groups to a Final Rule passed by the Environmental Protection Agency that 
exempts farms from certain reporting requirements under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CER-
                                                                                                                           
 40 See id.; see also supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 41 Scalia, supra note 21, at 514–15. 
 42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 43 Pauley, 501 U.S. at 696 (stating that Congress delegates policymaking authority through 
express delegation or the introduction of ambiguous text in the statute); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–
44 (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of 
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”). 
 44 Pauley, 501 U.S. at 696 (“Judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous 
provisions of the statutes it is authorized to implement reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of 
the political and judicial branches.”); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (stat-
ing that courts must defer to agency authority when Congress has intended to delegate, but only 
when Congress has done so); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866 (stating that judicial deference is required 
to ensure that policy decisions are made by the branches that are democratically elected). 
 45 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (discussing the responsibility of courts to respect Congress’s 
power to delegate policymaking authority to executive agencies); supra note 40. 
 46 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. 
 47 Id.; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). This concern regarding the 
judiciary minimizing its role to interpret the law is raised by Judge Brown’s concurrence in this 
case, which she refers to as “judicial abdication.” Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 539 (Brown, J., 
concurring). 
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CLA”) and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 
1986 (“EPCRA”).48 CERCLA and EPCRA require entities to report releases 
into the environment of substances determined to be hazardous and extremely 
hazardous, respectively, in quantities over certain thresholds.49 The Final Rule 
granted a limited exception to these general reporting requirements, exempt-
ing farms from reporting the release of ammonia and hydrogen sulfide from 
animal waste into the air.50 
The EPA justified the exemption on the grounds that such farm reports 
were unlikely in most cases to result in government response or intervention, 
while the costs of compliance were significant for both the farms and the 
agency itself.51 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, however, ac-
cepted evidence, which was not refuted by the EPA, that a government re-
sponse was not wholly impossible.52 Commenters to the EPA’s Proposed Rule 
raised concerns regarding the dangers of unusually concentrated releases that 
                                                                                                                           
 48 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603, 11004 (2012); Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 
2017); CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for Air Releases of Hazardous 
Substances from Animal Waste at Farms, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,948, 76,948 (Dec. 18, 2008) (codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 302, 355). CERCLA, also known as Superfund, was enacted in 1980 to remediate 
sites contaminated with toxic waste. Superfund: CERCLA Overview, U.S. EPA, https://
www.epa.gov/superfund/superfund-cercla-overview [https://perma.cc/4GLT-6ECY]. EPCRA, 
enacted in 1986 in response to a series of high-profile chemical spills (including one in Bhopal, 
India), identifies locations of toxic chemicals and requires facilities to develop emergency disaster 
plans. What Is EPCRA?, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/epcra/what-epcra [https://perma.cc/
AUD4-XN6C]. The Final Rule was established through informal legislative rulemaking, which is 
done through a process called notice-and-comment. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); PIERCE, supra note 34, 
at 561–68 (explaining informal rule-making processes). In this process the agency submits a pro-
posed rule, which is open for the public and interested parties to comment on. 5 U.S.C. § 533. 
After the close of the comment period, the agency may revise the rule, and then promulgates it in 
its final form. Id. The rule in Waterkeeper Alliance was first proposed on December 28, 2007, and 
open for comments for ninety days. CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative Reporting Exemption for 
Air Releases of Hazardous Substances from Animal Waste at Farms, 73 Fed. Reg. at 76,951. The 
final rule was published on December 18, 2008, to take effect on January 20, 2009. Id. at 76,949. 
 49 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603(a), 11004(a). These reports are sent to the National Response Center, 
which then informs all necessary government agencies, including local officials. id. 
 50 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 530. There was a carve-out in the Final Rule that denied the 
EPCRA exemption to large-scale meat-producing farms, also known as concentrated animal feed-
ing operations (“CAFOs”). Id. at 532. The National Pork Producer’s Council entered the case to 
challenge the CAFO carve-out, however, because the court vacated the Final Rule and this chal-
lenge was not considered. Id. at 538. 
 51 Id. at 532; see id. at 536–37. The EPA specifically determined that “in most cases” a re-
sponse would be impractical, though the court emphasized that the qualification therefore implied 
that there are some situations that would call for a response. Id. at 536. The EPA estimated that 
over ten years, the exemption would save over $60 million in compliance costs for farms, and $8 
million in costs for federal agencies. Id. at 537. 
 52 Id. at 536. The court stated that potential responses within the EPA’s authority include both 
removal and remedial actions. Id. at 537. These actions can take the form of instituting monitoring 
requirements, requiring stricter safety measures for storage of hazardous materials, relocating 
neighboring residents, and other protective measures. Id. The EPA, in defending the rule, argued 
that these types of responses would “rarely” be used, but could not conclusively rule them out. Id. 
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occur as a result of manure storage.53 This storage requires agitation of the 
storage pit, which can result in significant, concentrated releases that have the 
potential to endanger nearby humans and animals.54 State and national emer-
gency response agencies also testified to the value of disclosure of potentially 
harmful emissions, both for direct intervention and for evaluating emergency 
calls and tips.55 
The case was brought directly to the D.C. Circuit under a jurisdictional 
provision in CERCLA that provides for direct review by the Court of Ap-
peals.56 The EPA argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge 
CERCLA (and thus lacked a jurisdictional hook to be in the Court of Ap-
peals).57 According to the EPA, the plaintiffs had not suffered sufficient inju-
ry, because CERCLA does not require public disclosure of the reported in-
formation.58 EPCRA’s reporting requirements, however, which do trigger dis-
closure, are tied to those established in CERCLA.59 Thus any reduction in 
CERCLA requirements, like that established by the Final Rule, results in a 
reduction of disclosures under EPCRA, and therefore a reduction of publicly 
disclosed information.60 
II. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S TWO OPINIONS IN WATERKEEPER ALLIANCE V. EPA 
A. The Majority Opinion Rules That the EPA Lacked the  
Authority to Pass the Final Rule 
The D.C. Circuit determined that the EPA did not possess sufficient au-
thority to grant the Final Rule exempting farms from its reporting require-
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. at 536. 
 54 Id. at 536–67. The court noted that the exposures caused by pit agitation poses significant 
risks, with fatalities reported. Id. Despite the risks, the EPA stated that such activities would “rare-
ly” require an agency response. Id. The court again seized on the term “rarely” as an implication 
that there might be times that such a response is necessary. Id. 
 55 Id. An emergency planning commission illustrated the value of this knowledge in a scenar-
io in which emergency responders receive a call in the dead of night reporting a foul odor. Id. at 
537. The information in the CERCLA/EPCRA reports would give the responders an idea of possi-
ble causes of the odor, and possibly narrow an investigation when the agencies begin a search. Id. 
at 537. Commenters to the Proposed Rule also emphasized the need to keep local authorities in-
formed of potentially dangerous situations. Id. 
 56 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (2012). EPCRA does not contain a similar provision. Waterkeeper All., 
853 F.3d at 532. The court can hear a consolidated challenge involving multiple statutes as long as 
one of the statutes provides for direct review. Id. at 533; Shell Oil Co. v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1186, 
1195 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 57 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 533. 
 58 Id. The Supreme Court has ruled that plaintiffs suffer an informational injury sufficient to 
grant standing when an agency action cuts them off from “information which must be publicly 
disclosed pursuant to a statute.” FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998). 
 59 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603(a), 11004(a); Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 534. 
 60 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 534. 
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ments under CERCLA and EPCRA.61 The court stated that the agency did not 
point to specific statutory ambiguity, but rather pointed to “unrelated exemp-
tions” written into the statutes by Congress that it believed “collectively cre-
ate ambiguity.”62 The court stated that this was not a viable foundation for an 
exercise of agency interpretation.63 The court therefore ruled that the Final 
Rule was not a valid exercise of agency authority, and vacated the rule.64 
The court began its analysis using the formulation of Chevron laid out in 
Entergy Corp., which interpreted Chevron to say that a “reasonable agency 
interpretation prevails.”65 This formulation cut out Chevron step one because 
there is no mention of ambiguity, and specifically omitted the sequential na-
ture of the inquiry.66 
The court nonetheless answered the ambiguity question, finding that the 
EPA’s attempt to find implied ambiguity in the reporting requirements by 
pointing to other exceptions was insufficient.67 The EPA argued that the pres-
ence of other exceptions to the general reporting requirements creates ambi-
guity as to whether the EPA had the authority to pass further exemptions.68 
The court noted that the presence of some exceptions written into the statuto-
ry text did not necessarily bar all others, particularly in administrative con-
texts where Congress often left issues up to agency discretion.69 In this case, 
however, the court determined that Congress combined those limited exemp-
tions with an otherwise “sweeping reporting mandate” in CERCLA and 
EPCRA.70 This mandate constituted a “straightforward reporting require-
                                                                                                                           
 61 Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 537–38 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 62 Id. at 534. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 537–38. 
 65 Id. (citing Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 (2009)). 
 66 See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
 67 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 534. 
 68 Id. The statues include exceptions for certain types of pollution (including automobile ex-
haust and certain nuclear material), cases that do not result in exposure to the public at large (such 
as exposures that are contained entirely within a workplace), and releases that are already reported 
under other federal statutes. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2012). 
 69 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 534. The court states that the presence of the exceptions, had 
they been on their own, may have been enough to read in authority for the EPA to grant further 
exceptions. Id. This is consistent with Chevron’s general spirit of deference, particularly the theo-
ry of implied deference. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 
967, 982–83 (2005) (holding that agency interpretations, when they satisfy Chevron, can contra-
dict judicial interpretations); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 842, 
844 (1984) (instructing courts to defer to the reasonable policy decisions made by executive agen-
cies). 
 70 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 535. The language in CERCLA requires reporting of “any” 
release over the minimum, and EPCRA’s requirements refer directly to those required under 
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603(a), 11004(a) (2012). 
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ment” that allowed no room for the EPA to construe ambiguity to create au-
thority to pass further exemptions.71 
The EPA also pointed to its authority to establish certain administrative 
aspects of the reporting requirements, including setting the minimum reporta-
ble quantities and a general authority to pass any regulations necessary to car-
ry out the provisions of the statutes.72 According to the court, these grants of 
authority gave the EPA the ability to designate additional reportable substanc-
es, but did not provide a basis for authority to exempt substances already re-
quired under the statute.73 The EPA read into this grant of authority, along 
with Congress’s prior authorized exemptions, a congressional intention to 
maximize efficiency and limit the burden on reporting entities and govern-
ment agencies.74 The court granted that this may have been a motivation for 
some of the exceptions, but absent specific language granting EPA the author-
ity to consider efficiency in its administration of the reporting statutes, the 
EPA could not pass this exemption on the basis of efficiency analysis.75 The 
agency, the court stated, could not disregard Congress’s instructions just be-
cause it determined a reporting requirement was “not worth the trouble.”76 
The EPA also asserted its de minimis power, which allows agencies to 
disregard the literal terms of a statute if enforcing those terms would result in 
“pointless expenditure,” which occurs if there is no regulatory benefit at all.77 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Waterkeeper All., 852 F.3d at 535. Further, the statutes lack what the court calls “language 
of delegation,” such as “as appropriate,” “under circumstances to be determined by the EPA,” and 
the like. Id. Thus the court found no evidence to support the EPA’s contention that Congress had 
granted it authority to alter the generally broad reporting requirements. Id. 
 72 Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9615, 11048. 
 73 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 535. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. Any further exceptions would contravene Congress’s intent to require broad, compre-
hensive reports of any releases of hazardous material, as made clear in the statutes. Id. This read of 
a sweeping mandate is essential, and sets the case apart from Entergy Corp., in which the Supreme 
Court allowed the EPA to engage in a cost-benefit analysis under provisions of the Clean Water 
Act because there was no such mandate. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 222 
(2009). Other provisions in the Clean Water Act allowed for cost considerations, and the specific 
provision in question did not forbid it. Id. at 223. Under Chevron analysis then, at least after En-
tergy Corp., agency action is generally allowable, unless it is expressly forbidden by Congress. Id. 
at 222. This comports with the general spirit of deference to agency expertise that animates Chev-
ron. See id. at 223 (recognizing that Chevron acts to expand the scope of permissive agency ac-
tion); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 854 (directing courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of 
the statutes the agencies implement). 
 77 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 535; Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (“Courts should be reluctant to apply the literal terms of a statute to mandate pointless ex-
penditures of effort.”). The court makes it clear, however, that the de minimis exception is not a 
balancing test, and so the power cannot be exercised if a regulatory benefit is found, regardless of 
whether the agency believes that this benefit is outweighed by the costs. Waterkeeper All., 853 
F.3d at 535; Ala. Power, 636 F.2d at 361 (stating that the de minimis exception is not available 
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Because the court found some value to be gained from the reports, the court 
held that the Final Rule exempting the farms from the standard reporting re-
quirements was beyond the EPA’s authority to pass.78 Thus, because the court 
found no statutory ambiguity to be interpreted and no basis for an exercise of 
the de minimis exception, it concluded that the EPA did not have the authority 
to pass the Final Rule.79 
B. Judge Janice Brown’s Concurrence Criticizes the  
Majority’s Chevron Analysis 
Judge Brown’s concurrence began by recognizing that the majority 
came to the correct conclusion in ruling that the EPA did not point to suffi-
cient ambiguity to justify its exercise of authority.80 The concurring opinion, 
however, criticized the majority for its clumsy formulation of the Chevron 
standard and its potential to confuse further Chevron analysis.81 According to 
Judge Brown, the issue with the majority’s use of Entergy Corp.’s formula-
tion of Chevron is that Entergy Corp. was limited to the principle that an 
agency’s unreasonable interpretation is outside of any ambiguity.82 This, she 
wrote, does not establish a rule for situations in which a court finds that the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable, but has not determined via Chevron step 
one that there is statutory ambiguity to interpret.83 
According to the concurrence, this case was easily disposed of via Chev-
ron step one.84 The EPA did not provide any statutory ambiguity that could 
grant it power to act, and therefore there was nothing left to analyze under 
                                                                                                                           
when the function provides some benefits, but when the agency determines those benefits are 
outweighed by the costs). 
 78 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 537. The court accepted evidence from the public commen-
tary on the proposed rule that put forth possible uses for the information. See supra notes 52–54 
and accompanying text. 
 79 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 537–38. 
 80 Waterkeeper All. v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., concurring). 
 81 Id. The court uses the formulation from Entergy Corp., which inverts the two-step analysis 
by beginning with “a reasonable agency interpretation prevails,” unless Congress has spoken on 
the issue, and the agency’s interpretation conflicts with Congress’s. Id.; Entergy Corp. v. River-
keeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009). 
 82 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 538 (Brown, J., concurring). This formulation goes through 
Chevron backwards, by first deciding if the interpretation is reasonable, before determining 
whether the statute is ambiguous. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 842, 842–43 (1984) (establishing a two-step test, for ambiguity followed by reasonableness). 
It does not alter the actual outcome of the test (because if the interpretation is unreasonable, it 
would have failed Chevron step two anyway), but risks complicating future applicability. See infra 
notes 101–105 and accompanying text (discussing the future-applicability issues of a simple rea-
sonableness test). 
 83 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 538 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 84 Id. 
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Chevron.85 Judge Brown emphasized the importance of step one’s gatekeep-
ing function because of what she viewed as a degradation of step two analy-
sis.86 If Chevron step two amounted to little more than a rubber stamp, step 
one would take on a more important role in limiting the opportunities for 
agencies to exercise unchecked authority.87 Further, as Judge Brown wrote, 
this step one analysis needed to remain wedded to statutory text.88 Departing 
from the text moved further away from Congress’s instructions, which al-
lowed more opportunity to give agencies authority that was never intended to 
be given them.89 
According to Judge Brown, a return to the proper form of Chevron anal-
ysis is necessary because the combination of skipping the step one threshold 
determination and the weakened step two reasonableness review results in 
very little teeth to the courts’ review of agency action.90 In order for the 
courts’ review to be more than a simple rubber stamp, the reviewing court 
would need to undertake substantive review, and the most effective way to do 
so is to stay grounded in the statutory text via Chevron step one.91 Finally, 
Judge Brown notes that an appeal of the one-step reasonableness standard is 
that it does not require a court to make a final decision on whether the statute 
is open to multiple meanings before considering the reasonableness of the 
agency’s interpretation.92 This, however, would trivialize the importance of 
statutory clarity and, therefore, the importance of Congress.93 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Id. Judge Brown rejected the EPA’s suggestion that unrelated statutory text can be a suffi-
cient basis for a finding of ambiguity. Id. 
 86 Id. She cites authority claiming that step two has been reduced to arbitrary and capricious 
review that is not strictly governed by the statutory text (which is Congress’s instructions) in ques-
tion. Id. Arbitrary and capricious is the standard called for under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, and so in itself should not be objectionable. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (requiring courts that 
are reviewing agency actions to set aside those actions found to be arbitrary and capricious). Judge 
Brown is concerned, however, that this diluted standard (which looks at the reasonableness of the 
agency’s decision only, and not at Congress’s instructions), when combined with weakened step 
one analysis, would result in a toothless review and very few agency actions being overturned. See 
Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 538-39 (Brown, J., concurring) (arguing that the effect of weakened 
Chevron analysis is “judicial abdication” from its duty to interpret the law). 
 87 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 538 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 88 Id. This, she wrote, is a particularly critical because step-two reasonableness analysis has 
tended to have little basis in the actual statutory text. Id. 
 89 Id. This is important because at the most basic level, all agency authority to act comes from 
that granted by Congress. See id.; La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) 
(holding that “an agency literally has no power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power 
on it”). The statutory text is the basis for the agency’s authority to act, so it needs to be considered 
when courts review that agency action. See La Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 374. 
 90 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 539 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id.  
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III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S CHEVRON ANALYSIS IN WATERKEEPER LACKS 
CLARITY AND DEPARTS FROM THE TWO STEP TEST 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit correctly ruled in Water-
keeper Alliance v. EPA that the EPA did not have the authority to pass the Fi-
nal Rule.94 The EPA did not identify any specific statutory ambiguity that 
would suffice to trigger Chevron deference, and its attempt to point to unre-
lated provisions that combine to “collectively” raise ambiguity was not a suf-
ficient basis either.95 Although the court came to the correct conclusion in the 
case, and did decide the essential ambiguity question, it did so in an imprecise 
manner that introduced further confusion into the Chevron analysis and con-
tinued on a path towards collapsing Chevron’s two-step inquiry into just a 
one-step reasonableness analysis.96 The majority’s analysis did not proceed 
through the sequential Chevron framework.97 This is evidenced by the court 
spending significantly more time on the issue of “collective” ambiguity than 
the argument deserves.98 If the Chevron analysis had been laid out in its prop-
er sequential form, it would have been readily evident that the notion of “col-
lective” ambiguity arising from unrelated statutory provisions provided no 
basis for agency interpretation that would warrant deference.99 The agency 
could not point to any specific ambiguity within the text, and according to 
Justice Stevens’s formulation in Chevron, that should have ended the in-
quiry.100 
The problem with allowing Chevron to collapse, as the concurrence rec-
ognized, is that a simple reasonableness inquiry allows courts to avoid mak-
ing a determination on whether a statute contains ambiguity or is susceptible 
to multiple meanings.101 Not only is this a departure from the judiciary’s duty 
to “say what the law is,” it also has potential consequences for later actions 
                                                                                                                           
 94 853 F.3d 527, 537–38 (D.C. Cir. 2017). (holding that the EPA lacked the authority for the 
rule because the statutes the agency was interpreting were unambiguous). 
 95 Id. at 534. 
 96 See id. at 537–38. (applying the Chevron standard but without utilizing the two-step 
framework). 
 97 Compare id. at 534–35 (reviewing the EPA’s action for reasonableness without first estab-
lishing the existence of ambiguity in the controlling statute), with Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 842, 842–43 (1984) (laying out the sequential two-step frame-
work). 
 98 See Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 538 (Brown, J., concurring) (arguing that the theory of 
“collective ambiguity” as advanced by the EPA threatens the entire Chevron framework). 
 99 See id. Step one, as discussed above, serves an important gatekeeping function. See supra 
notes 84–93 and accompanying text. Once the court determined that there was no ambiguity in the 
statute to be interpreted, the Chevron analysis should be complete. See Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d 
at 539 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 100 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter . . . .”). 
 101 Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 539 (Brown, J., concurring). 
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and proceedings that involve the statute, due to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Brand X.102 Brand X held that if a statute is found to be ambiguous, then an 
agency’s interpretation can trump a court’s prior interpretation of that stat-
ute.103 This means that the decision to find the statute ambiguous or not is 
what determines whether the court has the power to reject the agency’s deci-
sion.104 If the statute is ambiguous, then the agency’s interpretation will stand, 
unless it is found to be unreasonable.105 Thus courts should be clear on 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (declaring that it is “emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”). This judicial duty 
to determine the meaning of the law has been re-affirmed since the decision in Marbury. See, e.g., 
Perez v. Mortg. Banker’s Ass’n., 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1222-23 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring) (invok-
ing Marbury’s “say what the law is” language to question the validity of Seminole Rock deference 
to agency technical expertise). Congress explicitly granted this power to the judiciary via the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, which states that in the realm of administrative law, “the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret . . . statutory provisions . . . .” 5 
U.S.C. § 706 (2012). An abandonment of step one, which determines the delegation of authority 
through statutory interpretation (and is therefore a question of law), is inconsistent with this man-
date. See Waterkeeper All., 853 F.3d at 539 (Brown, J., concurring) (arguing that a Chevron analy-
sis that avoids making a step one determination departs from the courts’ duty to “say what the law 
is”); Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 32, at 625 n.50 (arguing that step one is a question of law 
because it determines the authority conferred to the agency by the statute). Though a court does 
not necessarily have to establish exactly what statutory text means, it must determine whether that 
statute is at least open to interpretation, and set the limits on the range of possible interpretations 
(in determining what would constitute an unreasonable interpretation). See Waterkeeper All., 853 
F.3d at 538 (Brown, J., concurring) (arguing that step one is where courts set the “boundaries of 
delegated authority,” which are the outer bounds within which the agency’s interpretations can 
reasonably fall); supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. Richard Pierce has argued that Chev-
ron is compatible with this duty because “say[ing] what the law is” is satisfied by the step one 
inquiry. PIERCE, supra note 34, at 163. Once the issue has been evaluated under step one, a deci-
sion has been made on the statute’s meaning (whether that meaning is clear, or some amount of 
ambiguity is present). Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 32, at 624. Chevron step two is a strictly 
policy question then, in which deference to agency discretion does not impose on the judiciary’s 
law-interpreting role. See Nat’l Cable and Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 
967, 986 (2005) (holding that upon finding a statute ambiguous at step one, courts are to defer to 
agency interpretations as long as they are “reasonable policy choice[s]”); PIERCE, supra note 34, 
at 161–62 (stating that Chevron step two covers policy decisions delegated by Congress to the 
agency interpreting the relevant statute); Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 32, at 624–25 (charac-
terizing the two steps of Chevron as the dual roles of the judiciary, the first its independent inter-
pretive role, and the second an oversight role). 
 103 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982. Though this appears unusual, as if the agency is allowed to 
“overrule” the court, it is simply the continued exercise of Chevron deference, just applied to a 
prior interpretation by a court, rather than one made in the moment. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 
(“[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable inter-
pretation made by the administrator of an agency.”). But see Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 
F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that a Brand X reversal of a 
court’s interpretation amounts to “an unconstitutional revision of a judicial declaration of the law 
by a political branch”). 
 104 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982. 
 105 Id. Unlike a determination, like in Brand X, where the court finds the statute unambiguous, 
and thus institutes its preferred meaning, if the court finds the agency’s interpretation unreasona-
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whether they are rejecting an agency’s interpretation because the statute is 
already unambiguous, or because the statute is ambiguous but the proffered 
interpretation is unreasonable.106 
CONCLUSION 
The battle over when courts are obligated to grant deference to agency 
interpretation of law continues on and figures to move to the forefront, as one 
of the Chevron doctrine’s most prominent critics, Neil Gorsuch, has ascended 
to the Supreme Court. In 2017, in Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit waded in again, correctly determining 
that the EPA had exceeded its authority when it passed the Final Rule. In do-
ing so, however, the court moved further towards collapsing the two-step 
Chevron formula, thereby potentially eroding Congress’s control over agency 
action, encompassing a large swath of American law. Future decisions should 
follow the two-step process laid out in the original decision, ensuring that the 
doctrine is only applied in cases where agencies were intended to have au-
thority to act from Congress. Doing so would also guarantee that all branches 
of government maintain their proper roles, with the legislature making the 
law, the judiciary interpreting it, and the executive carrying it out. 
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ble, it can only vacate the rule, and return the matter to the agency for a new decision. See id. 
(reversing a vacatur by the Ninth Circuit of an FCC rule on reasonableness grounds). 
 106 See id. at 982 (discussing the effects of a court’s prior interpretation of a statute on subse-
quent agency interpretation); see also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply LLC, 566 U.S. 
478, 493 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the effects of the Brand X decision and its 
requirement that reviewing courts explicitly indicate whether they find the statute to be ambiguous 
or unambiguous). 
